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The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2016
Scenarios and Recommendations
Abdelrahman Ayyash and Victor J. Willi
The removal of Mohammed Morsi from the presidency by the Egyptian army on 
July 3, 2013 led to a number of significant structural transformations within Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The security crackdown that has taken place since, in-
cluding the imprisonment of thousands of leaders and mid-level MB cadres, makes it 
nearly impossible for any central leadership to control the movement’s lower ranks.
At the same time, the radicalization of the Islamist scene following Morsi’s ouster has 
affected at least parts of the MB’s support base. While the argument that MB mem-
bers are joining violent extremist groups in large numbers frequently serves political 
purposes, radicalization among the MB’s ranks is in fact a real concern. The recruit-
ment potential of MB members to ISIS-affiliated groups, such as the Sinai-based or-
ganization Wilayat Sinai, was exemplified in a recent video, where an ISIS commander 
urged MB members to “use the experience they gained from ousting the previous 
regime of Hosni Mubarak to topple Sisi’s regime.”1 It also indicates that a sizable 
number of MB rank-and-file members are frustrated with their leaders’ reluctance to 
advocate a more aggressive stance against the regime, despite widespread human 
rights violations.
Given the complexity of the situation in Egypt, this report has a threefold objective: 
first, to provide an overview of the current state of Egypt’s national scene in general, 
and the MB in particular; second, to outline three scenarios for how the MB – as a 
still central, although vastly diminished, player within Egypt’s broader national scene 
– may evolve in the short to medium term; and finally, to recommend measures that 
may guide the thinking of German policymakers and support them as they stay 
abreast of the highly dynamic political situation in Egypt.
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The Overall Context in Egypt
The military regime in Egypt currently faces a number 
of significant challenges, chief among them the deeply 
depressed Egyptian economy. Although the fiscal year 
2014–15 ended with 4.2 percent growth, Egypt’s eco-
nomic fundamentals remain weak. Growth in past years 
was driven primarily by foreign direct investment and 
large-scale government spending. While Egypt’s central 
bank has spent billions to prop up the Egyptian pound’s 
exchange rate against the dollar, exports have sharply 
declined, with balance of payments deficits hitting 3.7 
billion dollars in the first quarter of fiscal year 2015–16. A 
sharper drop was prevented by the injection of six billion 
dollars by Egypt’s Arab Gulf allies as well as 1.5 billion 
dollars in loans from the African Development Bank and 
the World Bank. The expected profits from Egypt’s devel-
opment projects announced last March at an economic 
development conference in Sharm el Sheikh have failed 
to materialize. Similarly, despite massive investments in 
the Suez Canal expansion project, revenues have been 
declining as global trading activities diminish due to the 
slowing Chinese economy. 
In an effort to deflect attention from these economic 
ills, the Egyptian government is currently announcing 
new measures such as land reclamation projects that are 
supposed to reduce the risk of food insecurity. Indeed, the 
country’s economic collapse is prevented only by its being 
continuously propped up by the Gulf states; the result is 
the sell-off of large assets to foreign investors. 
The lack of economic progress is further exacerbated 
by the government’s inability to stabilize the security situ-
ation. The downing of the Russian Metrojet Airliner on 
October 31, 2015 by the ISIS-affiliated group Wilayat Sinai 
revealed the extent to which the government is unable 
to control the insurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. Acts of 
terrorism and armed resistance are eroding the trust of 
global investors and foreign governments in the govern-
ment’s ability to provide security. So did the government’s 
killing of eight Mexican tourists in a botched operation 
in September 2015. The desire to invest in the Egyptian 
economy has declined as a result. Major economic devel-
opment conferences have been cancelled, including the 
World Economic Forum on the Middle East, which was 
scheduled for May 2016 in Sharm el Sheikh. 
As a result, discontent within the Egyptian population 
is becoming more pronounced. Indeed, the general public 
has grown largely disillusioned and in many instances 
harbors resentment against a military regime that takes 
ever more repressive measures against civil society. This 
strategy of repression has reached its worst levels in 
decades and is now aimed not only at Egyptians but also 
at foreign researchers. The murder of Giulio Regeni, an 
Italian PhD student from Cambridge University who 
disappeared on January 25, 2016, shows the extent to 
which power within the Egyptian regime has become 
decentralized. The abduction of a foreign researcher 
in broad daylight could only have taken place within a 
political environment where rogue elements within the 
regime feel that they can operate with complete impunity. 
It reveals the extent of the growing fragmentation of the 
Egyptian polity.2 
Against this background, the internal organization 
of the Muslim Brotherhood has been transformed in 
significant ways. Specifically, a number of developments 
have further fractured an organization that was already 
internally divided along generational, organizational, 
and ideological lines.
Development of the Muslim Brotherhood 
since July 2013
The MB today consists of three main groups.3 First, there 
is the leadership of the so-called old guard, composed of 
members of the MB’s Guidance Office who had escaped 
the crackdown in Egypt. These include Mahmoud Ezzat, 
the organization’s Secretary General until December 2009 
and a powerful insider; Mahmoud Hussein, who became 
Secretary General after Ezzat; and Mahmoud Ghozlan, 
who remains the MB’s official spokesperson. This group 
also includes the London-based Ibrahim Munir, who has 
served as the MB’s “official spokesperson in the West” 
since 2010 and has lived in exile since 1981. 
The second group consists of mid-level MB cadres who 
have remained in Egypt since Morsi’s ouster. Having man-
aged to regroup after a few months, some started organiz-
ing “revolutionary” activities against government targets. 
In early 2014, the weekly meetings resumed within “the 
families” (al-usar, as the MB’s smallest educational units 
are called). In February 2014, internal elections were held 
to replace the imprisoned leaders with new cadres. They 
resulted in the formation of a Crisis Management Com-
mittee (lajna idara al-azma) that was tasked with manag-
ing events on the ground. Mohammed Badie – who con-
tinues to be recognized by senior members as the General 
Guide and, as such, the organization’s leading figure since 
2010 – has been under arrest since August 2013. However, 
control of the rank and file effectively passed to Mohamed 
Taha Wahdan, an agriculture professor who was appoint-
ed to the Guidance Office in January 2012 after previously 
heading the Committee of Upbringing (lajna tarbiyya).
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The third group, consisting of Egyptian exiles attempt-
ing to form a new base of operations, emerged in Istanbul 
in 2014. In April 2015, this group announced the formation 
of a body called the Crisis Management Office for Egyp-
tians Abroad (maktab idarat al-azma li’l-Masriyyin fi’l-
kharij) under the leadership of Ahmed ‘Abd al-Rahman, 
a medical doctor from Cairo. The stated purpose of the 
new office was to unite within a single entity the efforts 
of various individuals and organizations opposed to the 
military government, while maintaining relations with 
external donors and foreign governments. 
(See the attached appendix for a listing of the major 
Muslim Brotherhood figures named in this piece.)
The efforts of these different groups to reassume 
control over the MB’s financial and human resources 
have led to growing internal friction. For instance, the 
Istanbul-based Office for Egyptians Abroad was a novelty 
in the history of the MB and clearly competed with the 
London-based International Organization (al-tanzim 
al-dawli) that Ibrahim Munir has run since 2010. The 
Istanbul-based office launched a new discourse on social 
media platforms that was decisively more aggressive than 
the assertions of “peacefulness” (silmiyya) promoted by 
the exiled Guidance Office. 
In January 2014, the MB’s Arabic-language website 
issued a statement whose vocabulary indicated an 
abandonment of the path of non-violence: “We are at 
the beginning of a new phase where we summon our 
strength and evoke the meaning of jihad…. [We] prepare 
ourselves, our wives, our sons and daughters, and who-
ever follows our path for relentless jihad where we ask for 
martyrdom.”4 
Other statements were issued on the Facebook account 
of a previously unknown individual called Mohammed 
Montasser, who claimed to be the MB’s new official 
spokesperson. (Montasser’s name is likely an alias.)
On May 16, 2015 a court in Cairo announced that it 
would uphold the death sentences of Morsi and over one 
hundred other senior MB leaders, including Mohammed 
Badie. While the Istanbul-based group of teh MB support-
ed the calls for revolution, Mahmoud Ghozlan published 
an article on Facebook entitled “Our Strength is Our 
Peacefulness.”5 Simultaneously, Mahmoud Hussein de-
clared that the Guidance Office “works through its bodies 
and institutions” and that it was the only body that “man-
ages the work of the society according to its by-laws.”6 
A few days later, to the surprise of observers and insid-
ers alike, Ghozlan and Abdelrahman al-Barr (the promi-
nent MB mufti and member of the Guidance Office) were 
seen in Cairo, where they attempted to reassert control 
over the rank and file. Both have since been arrested, 
while few know the whereabouts of their fellow Guidance 
Office member, Mahmoud Ezzat.
Despite the Guidance Office’s efforts to project an 
image of unity, the MB’s restless base in Egypt was not 
placated. Both Mohammed Montasser (who first emerged 
in 2014 in a Facebook account, advertising himself as the 
official MB spokesperson) and the Crisis Management 
Committee declared that the group would continue from 
within Egypt to pursue its revolutionary path. On July 1, 
2015, thirteen MB members were killed in a police raid on 
an apartment in Egypt’s Sixth of October City, inducing 
the Crisis Management Committee in Egypt to escalate 
its rhetoric. Montasser’s Facebook account stated that 
this latest aggression constituted a “turning point” that 
initiated a “new phase of confrontation.” MB leaders 
would “not be able anymore to control the anger of the 
base,” Montasser warned.7 He highlighted developments 
in the MB’s administrative structure to allow for the more 
effective execution of ground operations to uphold the 
“revolutionary work.” On social media, many rank-and-file 
members dismissed the claims of the elders. They argued 
that a commitment to non-violence in the face of relent-
less onslaughts by the army amounted to collaborating 
with the government.
With key members of the Crisis Management Commit-
tee in prison, efforts were made to form a new body to 
represent the MB in Egypt. The government’s crackdown 
of July 2015, as well as Ezzat’s presence in Cairo, may 
have led to a coming together of the exiled Guidance 
Office, the emerging office in Istanbul, and local activists 
in Cairo. Sometime between August and October 2015, a 
High Administrative Committee (lajna idariyya ‘uliya) 
was formed to replace the Crisis Management Committee. 
Its key members included both Ezzat loyalists as well as 
activists who stood closer to the revolutionary path, such 
as Mohammed Kamal, the head of the newly formed High 
Administrative Committee.
Shortly before December 17, the British government 
published its long-awaited review of the MB, which 
in turn led to a new eruption of internal conflict.8 On 
December 16, Mahmoud Hussein of the “old guard” gave 
an interview on Al Jazeera in Istanbul in which he sought 
to portray the organization’s unity to the outside world. 
Hidden between the lines of Hussein’s statements was 
an attempt to prepare the rank and file in Egypt for the 
decision to suspend the Guidance Office memberships 
of Mohammed Montasser and Mohammed Kamal and 
relieve them of their  administrative responsibilities. 
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The response on social media was intense. Many 
pledged loyalty to the confrontationist stance. Gradually, 
internal disagreements started to affect operations on the 
ground. Different geographical sectors issued statements, 
pledging allegiance to their respective power centers, 
with some sectors siding with the old guard and the rest 
with the revolutionary leadership. 
At the beginning of 2016, the MB is a highly fragment-
ed group in the throes of significant internal transforma-
tion both in terms of organizational structure and ideol-
ogy. At such a sensitive juncture, a considerable number 
of its base supporters are vulnerable to radicalization. In 
the face of continued government crackdown, the MB’s 
internal fragmentation extends all the way down to the 
“branch” (shu‘aba) level – the second-lowest level after 
the “family” (usra). This means that even within a single 
“region” (muntaqa, as the third level of organization is 
called), different branches are aligned with different ideo-
logical goals and political strategies. This situation makes 
any form of central organization difficult to maintain and 
shows the extent to which things are out of control.
Scenarios
Policymakers in Germany should consider three possible 
scenarios for how the MB – as well as the broader political 
situation in Egypt – may unfold in the medium term. In 
conceptualizing these scenarios, the authors of this paper 
took into account the MB, the larger structure of the 
institutional system in Egypt, and the role of the current 
regime in particular. The scenarios are based on the as-
sumption that the MB’s transformation will be shaped in 
decisive ways by how the broader political framework in 
Egypt evolves in the future. 
Scenario 1: This scenario posits that the regime will 
remain strong and unified while the MB continues to frag-
ment. The government’s harsh crackdown manages to 
quell internal dissent, while the regime is able to counter 
any sizable pressure from the international community. 
Further, the regime manages to keep terrorist activities at 
the periphery while reasserting control over the security 
situation at the center. In the absence of viable external 
or internal challenges to the government, the MB base 
in Egypt becomes demoralized and passive. Its local 
leadership loses credibility, while rank-and-file members 
become demotivated. The situation of competing internal 
coalitions trying to assert control will continue in some 
form, but it will mainly play out abroad. Meanwhile, 
the MB’s operations in Egypt will drift further apart. 
Faced with a continued lack of strategy and diminishing 
 financial viability, rank-and-file members will become 
alienated from Muslim Brotherhood ideology and turn 
to better funded organizations advocating radical takfiri 
methods.9
Scenario 2: According to this scenario, the internal 
political situation remains fluid, and the MB’s organiza-
tion becomes more unified. Discontent within the broader 
Egyptian public – fueled by a worsening economic situ-
ation and widespread indignation over human rights 
abuses – leads to an uptick in contentious revolutionary 
activity. Local protests, particular labor and strike ac-
tions, intensify and are met with growing repression by 
the regime, which in turn further fuels discontent among 
an increasingly restless general population. The MB’s 
local leadership will take on a greater role in organizing 
street protests, challenging the security establishment 
on different levels. This in turn will strengthen the MB’s 
credentials, empowering both local activists and the 
relative position of the Istanbul office. In response, senior 
Guidance Office members (the “old guard”) recognize 
the growing authority of the MB in Egypt and increase 
support for local operations against the Egyptian gov-
ernment. The movement as a whole will unify around a 
more radical ideology, undertaking violent actions that 
are viewed as legitimate, according to the logic of the 
revolution as understood by the MB. Faced with growing 
internal threats, state institutions and the media rally 
around President Sisi and strengthen his position with re-
spect to his internal rivals. Despite the regime’s increased 
unification, the political situation will be more unstable 
and unpredictable than it is today. 
Scenario 3: The final scenario presumes a continuation of 
the regime’s internal fragmentation and posits a strength-
ening of the MB’s relative position. Pressure mounts on 
the regime as the situation in the Sinai Peninsula and in 
neighboring Libya deteriorates. Local franchises of ISIS 
and radicalized elements within the MB step up terror-
ist operations against state and civilian targets. Unable 
to control the threats both at the center and the periph-
ery, the military regime is increasingly challenged from 
multiple power centers within the Egyptian state, includ-
ing from within the military but also from the police, the 
judiciary, and the people (al-sha‘ab). The MB will remain 
fragmented, with different factions seeking to collaborate 
on a tactical level with elements of state security against 
Sisi’s rule and hoping to prepare the ground for re-enter-
ing the formal political process. Despite internal fragmen-
tation, however, the organization’s relative power will 
be strengthened, with parts of the organization teaming 
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up with state elements against the current regime. The 
 political situation remains unstable and the potential 
for a coup from within the regime remains high, while 
national and international support for the MB grows.
Recommendations
Contemplating these three scenarios, German policy- 
makers can take a number of measures to stay on top of 
the fluid, unpredictable, and highly dynamic situation in 
Egypt today. 
Four concrete recommendations are: 
Reaffirm a strong commitment to core values of tolerance, 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and social justice. 
Especially after the recent murder of the Italian student 
Giulio Regeni, it is crucial for the German government 
and other EU member states – and for academic institu-
tions and civil society at large – to speak out against 
human rights violations. Germany should make clear that 
the country’s economic cooperation with Egypt and Ger-
man foreign direct investment into the Egyptian economy 
depend on clear improvements within Egypt, including 
security sector reforms. 
Continue to strengthen intercultural activities between 
Germany and Egypt, especially support for human rights 
organizations, NGOs, and cultural institutions. Such sup-
port is of enormous symbolic value. It is further recom-
mended that the German government continue to logisti-
cally and financially support exchanges among civil-soci-
ety activists, journalists, researchers, young professionals, 
academics, intellectuals, artists, and cultural figures in 
the framework of workshops, conferences, seminars, and 
events.
Increase logistical and financial support for Egypt’s 
emerging entrepreneurship scene, specifically encouraging 
companies in the technology and education sectors. Invest-
ing in the tech start-up sector will support grassroots 
activists on the ground while diminishing the potential 
for radicalization among Egyptian youths as a result of 
unemployment. The opportunities created by the global 
communication revolution, especially the combined 
trends of high Internet penetration rates in Egypt and 
falling costs of communication globally, offer a creative, 
non-political, and smart way to increase social invest-
ment and create a more inclusive economy.
Support further research into the internal evolution 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Special attention should be 
given to conducting field-based research, with a focus on 
Istanbul, Doha, and Khartoum. It is further recommended 
to commission an extensive research project that maps 
key local, regional, global actors, networks, and organiza-
tions, in addition to identifying the central stakeholders 
and mechanisms that constitute the “MB ecosystem.” 
Specific attention should be given to understanding the 
MB as part of the geopolitics of the Middle East and North 
Africa, in particular the relationships with key regional 
governments, including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Sudan.
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Appendix: Current Figures within the Muslim Brotherhood
Mohammed Badie: “old guard” MB leader and longtime 
spiritual guide of the organization; General Guide of the 
MB since January 2010; arrested in August 2013 and sen-
tenced to death in May 2015
Abdelrahman al-Barr: member of the MB’s “old guard” 
leadership; prominent MB mufti and member of the Guid-
ance Office; arrested in May 2015
Mahmoud Ezzat: “old guard” MB leader; acting General 
Guide of the MB since 2013 and member of the Guidance 
Office since 1981; current whereabouts unknown
Mahmoud Ghozlan: member of “old guard” MB leader-
ship and official spokesperson of the MB since ca. 2004; 
arrested in May 2015
Mahmoud Hussein: “old guard” MB leader; member of 
the Guidance Office since 2004 and Secretary General 
since 2010
Mohammed Kamal: Egypt-based head of the MB’s High 
Administrative Committee since October 2015; adherent 
of the newer revolutionary current
Mohammed Montasser (alias): spokesperson since ca. 
January 2014 of the more revolutionary Egypt-based MB; 
true identity unknown; role as “official spokesperson” has 
been contested
Mohammed Morsi: longtime MB member and president 
of Egypt from to June 2012 to July 2013; currently under 
arrest and sentenced to death in May 2015.
Ibrahim Munir: “old guard” MB leader and “official 
spokesperson in the West”; head since 2010 of the London-
based International Organization of the MB (al-tanzim 
al-dawli) 
Ahmed ‘Abd al-Rahman: leader of Crisis Management 
Office for Egyptians Abroad, founded in Istanbul in April 
2015; his role as “official spokesperson in the West” is 
contested
Mohamed Taha Wahdan: Egypt-based member of the 
Guidance Office since January 2012 and Head of the Crisis 
Management Committee since February 2014; adherent of 
the newer revolutionary current
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